Smuggling wars in the Sahara?

On Saturday, the last bit of proof I have sought since last year about surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) leaving Libya became public, when Reuters reported that Algerian security forces had seized a sizable cache of the weapons a little more than 60 km south of In Amenas, itself about 40 km from the border with Libya. On Monday the francophone Algerian daily El Watan provided more details on the story, noting that the stock, which had been carefully protected and buried in the desert, contained 43 missiles, including 28 SA-7 missiles as well as 15 of the significantly newer and more advanced SA-24 (oddly, the link to the original El Watan article seems to have disappeared from the website). This is of course important news, as it would seem to confirm what Algerian and Chadian leaders first warned about last March, that highly advanced missiles were being taken from Libya – though we do not know for certain when the weapons actually began disappearing into other countries.

Unsurprisingly given the concern about the threat these weapons may pose to civilian aviation, this story was reproduced by several wire services and press outlets. But for me another key part of the story that got less attention was that Algerian security forces only discovered the weapons stores after another trafficker or group of traffickers tipped them off.

The weapons seem to have been at a midway point in the delivery process; as the original article noted, after bringing in the weapons from Libya, smugglers wrap the stock in protective plastic before burying it and marking the location on a GPS. Once the prospective buyer has paid for the weapons, the article continues, they are then given the GPS coordinates for their brand new supply of missiles, guns, or whatever else might be buried in the desert.

While the article did not go into more detail, the suggestion of rivalries among weapons traffickers in southeastern Algeria raises some intriguing questions for me. The first is, well, why talk to the Algerian authorities? Did Algerian authorities arrest a group of traffickers who then squealed on another group? Was this a calculated attempt to eliminate rivals, curry favor with authorities, or perhaps drive up the price of other available weapons? And presuming this was not the only collection of such weapons that have made it across the border, how many others have gotten through? After all, Algeria’s government says that they arrested 214 weapons smugglers in 2011 – including 87 Libyans – but this is the first publicly announced seizure of SAMs that I can recall.

This leaves just one final question: Where were these weapons going? The natural choice for many would be al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), though there are other militant and criminal networks in the Sahel and North or West Africa that could certainly make use of these weapons. However, it is worth noting that relatives of key Sahelian AQIM commander Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (Or Abid Hammadou, or Mohamed Ghdir, depending on which name you prefer) are known as prominent smugglers in this region as well as in Libya, where Abou Zeid himself reportedly operated as a smuggler before entering into militancy.

Indeed,  some sources suggested that relatives of Abou Zeid may have been responsible for the brief kidnapping last month of the prefect of the Illizi province following guilty verdicts handed down by an Algerian court not just on Abou Zeid but also on several family members. Other sources indicated that the kidnappers were AQIM members under Abou Zeid’s command, though the two are not mutually exclusive. Either way, the kidnappers made quick time into Libya, where they were stopped by Libyan militia forces a day later and more than 100 km away from the Algerian border.

All of this goes to show that for all of the discussions of weapons smuggling in the post-Qaddafi Sahel, there’s been relatively less public inquiry into the extremely complicated networks of smugglers in the Sahel, groups sometimes linked by direct family ties, by tribe, by ideology, or just by the allure of cash. Yet in order to understand how weapons, drugs, cigarettes, and people circulate in the Sahel’s clandestine networks, we need to learn more about the smugglers who make these trades possible.

Jihadi Soft Power in Tunisia: Ansar al-Shari’ah’s Convoy Provides Aid to the Town of Haydrah in West Central Tunisia [WITH PICTURES]

Yesterday, the salafi group Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia provided aid in a convoy to residents in the city of Haydrah (Haïdra) in West Central Tunisia who have been hit hard by extremely cold weather. This may give pause and alarm to the elites in Tunis. As Erik Churchill, based in Tunisia and an independent development consultant, pointed out to me: “The French speaking elites have been patting themselves on the back the last few weeks for their ability to mobilize aid to these regions. Ansar al-Shari’ah’s work shows that the elites (both secular and an-Nahdha) do not have a monopoly on this kind of social work.”

Over the previous few weeks, there has been a major cold front, which included sub-zero temperatures and snow in northwest and west central Tunisia in regions within the governorates of Jendouba and Kasserine. Due to the remoteness of some of the locations and coinciding with many strikes and protests by factory and distribution center workers, there has been a major shortage of essential goods to stay warm and replenish food supplies. According to Tunisia-Live:

Despite the fact that the new interim president and members of the interim government have visited several regions of the country in the past week, no efficient measures were taken to deal with the scarcity of essential goods in the North West.

However, while the government has failed to provide an answer, Tunisian citizens have tried to create solutions. A group of Tunisians living in Germany started a volunteering company, using social networking to collect covers and clothes for those struggling with the cold in the deprived rural areas of the north-west. The group of Tunisian-Germans were looking for more volunteers within Tunisia to help them deliver covers and clothes to families in need.

Additionally, Qatar and UAE both sent airplane loads of supplies. There are also indigenous Tunisian groups that have attempted to assist, including El Kolna Twensa, Le PaCTE Tunisien, the Enfidha airport workers, and the Assabah/Le Temps newspaper group. Part of the issue is the lack of access due to roads being blocked by as many as 2.5 feet of snow in very rural areas. Although efforts were difficult, an-Nahdha did mobilize some of its supporters to help with relief efforts.

The secular-affiliated relief groups and organizations have targeted its aid more so to the governorate of Jendouba, since that region is viewed as more independent, moderate and socially liberal; whereas areas in the governorate of Kasserine are seen as more amenable to the message of a group like Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia. Although the snow has receded in some of the areas, the temperatures remain cold and residents such as in the city of Haydrah, which is in the governorate of Kasserine and about an hour northwest of the city of Kasserine, are still struggling to survive the harsh conditions.

On Saturday February 18th, the non-violent jihadi group Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia (that has connections to al-Qa’ida’s global jihadi online network) announced on its Facebook page that it was planning a convoy to take aid to suffering brethren to the town of Haydrah on Monday the 20th. Prior to driving from Kasserine in a convoy of trucks and vans, the spiritual leader of Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia Shaykh Abu Ayyad al-Tunisi emphasized to his followers the wajib (obligation) of providing aid to those in need as an Islamic duty and that these services were an aspect of jihad fi sabil Allah (in the cause of God), which would hopefully lead eventually to the creation of an Islamic state or Caliphate. One can see a variety of pictures from Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia’s da’wah activities that assisted the residents in Haydrah below.

Interestingly, Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia is filling the vacuum of the Tunisian government, which is dealing with issues related to the economy, writing the constitution, and maintaining order while also redressing many grievances workers have. This type of social work had been what brought popularity to groups such as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt (and to a lesser extent an-Nahda in Tunisia because although Ben Ali’s former regime was corrupted they provided services far better than the Egyptian government). Assisting in social work gave space to preach ones ideology. As a result, if Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia is able to continue with similar efforts along with protesting cultural policies (the niqab and appropriate levels of freedom of expression/speech), one may see its small movement gain wider popularity. This could be especially true in rural areas where many citizens are more conservative, religious, and extremely disillusioned with the governments lack of attention to it. Churchill concurs stating: “an-Nahdha is very concerned that their social bona fides could be usurped by more extreme elements.”

Although in differing contexts, one sees similar efforts to provide services and governance in Yemen by Ansar al-Shari’ah in Yemen as well as Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin in Somalia. This differs from previous methods by jihadis, which did not emphasize providing social services and basic needs like the case of al-Qa’ida in Iraq or even al-Qa’ida Central to local populaces. From this, a potential pattern is emerging whereby jihadis have learned the valuable lesson of providing for locals to curry more support versus blindly just calling for jihad and rhetorically speaking about a future Islamic state. In short, they are actually (dare I say) on a minuscule level providing a positive good versus just wrecking havoc through audacious suicide attacks and bombings. Either way, not only should the secularists in Tunis be worried about the potentially rising popularity of anti-systemic pan-Islamists like Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia, but an important aspect of an-Nahda’s raison d’être and credibility is being challenged in the same way an-Nahda did to the old regime.

Convoy on its way to the City of Haydrah from the City of Kasserine

Unloading Aid From the Trucks and Vans

Distribution of the Aid

‘Asr (Afternoon) Prayer Following the Delivery of Aid

Ansar al-Shari’ah’s Caravan of Aid Leaves Haydrah

Signs Beyond Western Eyes: Unpacking The Announcement of the al-Bara’ ibn Malik Martyrs Brigade

This past Thursday, on February 16, a group of around twenty individuals claiming to be part of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), released a video message to YouTube announcing the formation of a new battalion named the al-Bara’ ibn Malik Martyrs Brigade. It should be noted that during the Iraq war, al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) also named one of their battalions the al-Bara’ ibn Malik Martyrs Brigade. There is no definitive proof that the new battalion established by the FSA is connected with the old al-Qa’ida in Iraq networks. That said, one should be cognizant of the expansive facilitation networks there were for foreign fighters attempting to join the Iraq jihad in Syria.

حمص الصامدة الجيش الحر إعلان تشكيل كتيبة البراء بن مالك 16 2 2012

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There are many layers to unpack from the video itself as well as the name chosen for the martyr brigade and its potential illusions.

With the recent revelations that al-Qa’ida was allegedly behind a series of suicide bombings in Syria over the past few months, along with Ayman al-Zawahiri’s recent video giving support to the Syrian “mujahidin;” much worry has risen over the specter of al-Qa’ida influencing and/or hijacking the opposition movement in Syria that hopes to topple Bashar al-Asad and his current regime.

The Flags

Many will point to the flag in the background used in the above video as a sign that these individuals are indeed al-Qa’ida since it looks strikingly similar to the one used by al-Qa’ida’s Islamic State of Iraq (For more background on al-Qa’ida’s use of flags and its context in Islamic history read here):

FSA background flag

Islamic State of Iraq's flag.

Indeed, it is a worrying sign. At the same time, one should also note that in the above video, they also bear the old Syrian flag:

As such, for any student of al-Qa’ida and jihadism, the use of a Syrian flag shows direct support of a nationalist project, which is contrary to al-Qa’ida’s worldview. This is because the nation-states carved out were established not by God, but rather by the British and French. From this, one could posit that the al-Qa’ida looking flag used in the above video has become popularized to a broader audience then just a global jihadist one. More specifically, “the Che Guevara-ing” of the flag insofar as it has just become a symbol of resistance than necessarily a sign that the group has allegiance to al-Qa’ida. At the same time, the name used for the martyrs brigade (as AQI did, too) may abrogate or disprove this potential theory.

Who is al-Bara’ ibn Malik?

Prior to discussing the significance of the name of the martyrs brigrade in the context of al-Qa’ida, it is worthwhile to delve into the figure al-Bara’ ibn Malik to try and better understand why the FSA (and AQI) would invoke this figures name. Ibn Malik was one of the Muslim prophet Muhammad’s sahabah (companions) and considered an ansar (supporter) from the tribe of Banu al-Khazraj since they established relations with Muhammad’s nascent movement of mu’minin (believers) following the hijra to Medina (originally Yathrib). Ibn Malik is the brother of the famous sahabi Anas ibn Malik, an aide to Muhammad and who is one of the major narrators of hadith.

al-Bara’ ibn Malik originally took part in the Battle of Yamamah, which was part of the Riddah (apostasy) wars following the death of the Muslim prophet Muhammad. After the ascension of Abu Bakr as-Sadiq as the first Caliph some tribes and individuals apostatsized from Islam and attempted to return to their original religious practices. Abu Bakr called for war against them leading to a series of battles in 632-634 CE/11-13 H. The Battle of Yamamah is most famous for the deaths of a large portion of Qur’anic reciters, which led Abu Bakr to start the codification of the Qur’an into a written mushaf, since beforehand the Qur’an was recited orally. In the latter part of the Battle of Yamamah, when the opposition forces led by Musaylimah (referred in Islamic historiography as al-Kadhab or the Liar) were beginning to lose the battle they hid behind a gated garden. Prior to launching an assault on the garden, al-Bara’ ibn Malik stated: “يا أهل المدينة، لا مدينة لكم اليوم، إنما هو الله، والجنة” or “Oh People of al-Madinah, there is no al-Madinah for you after this day. There is only Allah, then Paradise.” Ibn Malik was hoisted upon a fellow soldiers shield to try and jump over the gate, which he succeeded. He sustained wounds, but was able to break open the gate allowing the rest of the Muslim army to defeat Musaylimah’s men. The episode would later refer to the “Garden of Death.” Although Ibn Malik had injuries, he recovered and later fought and was “martyred” in the Battle of Tustar against the Persian Empire in 640 CE/19 H.

There are three key points that should be highlighted from the above description of al-Bara’ ibn Malik: (1) he had an important role in defeating “apostates;” (2) his quote from above shows his willingness for martyrdom in the face of tough odds; and (3) he fought against the Persian Empire, which although Persians were not Muslims or Shi’a for that matter at that time one can imagine the symbolism of Ibn Malik fighting against the Persians. Jihadis today describe Shi’a (many being Persian) today as rawafid (Dissenters/Defectors/Deserters), which is a derogatory term, and do not believe they are true Muslims.

Contextualizing al-Bara’ ibn Malik Martyrs Brigades Today

Returning to the modern context, in both cases (AQI and the FSA), the name of the martyrs brigade fits and alludes to the three points made above regarding the biography of Ibn Malik. Regarding the first point, in both Iraq and Syria the fighters believe they are fighting apostate regimes. In Iraq against the ascendent Shi’a Mahdi Army and newly formed majority Shi’a Iraqi government and in the case of Syria al-Asad’s Alawite regime (seen as a sect of Shi’a Islam and viewed as heretical by even non-jihadi Sunni Muslims). As for the second point, it is quite obvious that they are martyrdom brigades and are therefore willing to sacrifice themselves in the face of great odds. And thirdly, the Iranian government was viewed in the Iraq war as assisting the Shi’a militias, while in the current context in Syria, the al-Asad regime is a known proxy of the Iranian regime. As such, in a round about way, in both the Iraq and Syrian versions of the al-Bara’ ibn Malik Martyrs Brigades they would be fighting the “Persian Empire” similar to Ibn Malik himself.

General Concluding Remarks About the Current State of Jihadism in Syria

The establishment of the FSA’s al-Bara’ ibn Malik Martyrs Brigade should give pause to talk of blindly arming the FSA as an alternative to the failed resolutions in the UN Security Council. That said, it is believed the FSA is a loose confederation without much centralization and therefore this battalion is most likely independent and doing its own thing. With the news of the potential release of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, the creation of a new local jihadi group Jabhat al-Nusrah, and reports of a foreign fighter from Kuwait being killed in Syria, it is clear Syria has become another important front in the jihadi war. The penetration of al-Qa’ida in Iraq into Syria and potential of foreign fighters arriving, should be watched closely. At the same time, ones support for the uprising to defeat the authoritarian al-Asad regime should not be looked at completely through the prism of al-Qa’ida nor should it preclude or discredit any attempts for supporting some elements within the opposition. There are certainly risks involved, but identifying and vetting elements within the Syrian opposition is something that needs to be further acted upon in a precise manner versus providing weapons haphazardly just because of horrific scenes of slaughter on YouTube that one views without fully thinking through the potential second and third order consequences.

The Formalizing of an Affiliation: Somalia’s Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen & Al-Qa’ida Central

‘Ali Mahamoud Rage (‘Ali Dheere), Al-Shabab’s spokesman, at a press conference on the killing of Usama bin Laden on May 6, 2011.

-Christopher Anzalone (McGill University)

UPDATE (23 February 2012): Al-Shabab’s Political and Governorates Office has issued two statements today.  The first congratulates the Muslim Ummah on its formal affiliation with Al-Qa’ida Central and gives “special thanks to our amir, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.”  It states that the Somali insurgent movement’s resources now fall under his authority.  It has yet to be seen if this leads to a significant change in Al-Shabab’s Somalia-centric insurgency.  The second thanks AQC’s Al-Sahab Media Foundation for producing the video announcing the affiliation as well as the Global Islamic Media Front for its longtime online distribution support of Al-Shabab.

UPDATE (17 February 2012): See insurgent photographs from a rally in Baidoa HERE.

UPDATE (14 February 2012): See a second set of insurgent photographs of the rallies HERE.

UPDATE (13 February 2012): Al-Shabab leaders have hosted celebrations across Lower Shabelle for the formalization of affiliation between their movement and Al-Qa’ida Central.  Among those leaders present were spokesman ‘Ali Mahamoud Rage (‘Ali Dheere), governor of Banaadir Muhammad Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman, governor of Lower Shabelle Muhammad Abu ‘Abdullah, and preacher ‘Abd al-Qadir Mu’min.  Noticeably absent, at least in insurgent photographs and the official statement announcing the celebrations, were Mukhtar “Abu Mansur” Robow and Hasan Dahir Aweys.  This may or may not mean the latter two were not present.  If they were not present it may be a sign of a rift, though the nature of cleavages in the movement remain hotly debated.  It is not the first time that not all the “public faces” of Al-Shabab were not present at a major event.  For example, ‘Ali Rage was not pictured in insurgent photographs or video footage of the movement’s conference marking the killing of Usama bin Laden in May 2011. Signs and banners held by civilians present express “joy” at the “union of the mujahideen” and “jihadi movement.”  To see insurgent photographs and read the official statement, see my post at VIEWS FROM THE OCCIDENT.

In a new media release, half audio message and half video message, released on Thursday, February 9 by Al-Qa’ida Central’s (AQC) media outlet, the Al-Sahab (The Clouds) Media Foundation, the group’s amir, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Ahmed Godane, the amir of the Somali insurgent movement Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Movement of the Warrior-Youth; Al-Shabaab) formally announced the official affiliation of Al-Shabab with AQC.  The announcement, which was teased a day prior to its release on jihadi-takfiri Internet forums, formalizes the relationship between the two groups following a lengthy history of ideological affinity and cooperation between them.  Its release has renewed discussions about how Al-Shabab should be classified, as mostly a local or regional insurgency, a transnational militant movement akin to AQC, or a mix of the two.  This post, like much of my current research and writing on Al-Shabab, attempts to make a modest contribution to this discussion.  I have and continue to argue that Al-Shabab is most accurately seen as a type of “glocal” militant movement, a mainly localized militant movement that uses transnational rhetoric and maintains an operational capability to carry out attacks outside of its home base inside Somalia, primarily but not necessarily limited to regional countries in East Africa.

Entitled, Glad Tidings from the Two Shaykhs, Abu al-Zubayr and Amir Ayman al-Zawahiri, the announcement is roughly evenly divided between an audio message from Godane, who is more commonly known in jihadi circles by his nom de guerre “Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr,” and a video segment from al-Zawahiri, who stoically gives “glad tidings to the Muslim Ummah (worldwide community), in particular to the mujahideen” regarding Al-Shabab’s joining of the Al-Qa’ida organization-led jihadi movement (al-harakat al-jihadiyya) against the alliance of Crusaders, Zionists, and their allies and agents, the munafiqeen (hypocrites, a term used for those who claim to be Muslims but whose actions prove otherwise).  He welcomes “our brothers” Al-Shabab and praises the steadfastness of the movement against the mounting Crusader attacks on it by the United States, Ethiopia, and Kenya, all of whom have become increasingly involved in the Somali civil war that pits Al-Shabab against the weak but internationally-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which depends on the nearly 10,000 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) soldiers for its survival.  Al-Zawahiri also urges Somalis to stay away from those religious scholars (‘ulama) who seek to lead them astray and who support the corrupt TFG leaders who have allied themselves to “Crusader” forces.

Al-Zawahiri sits in front of a green curtain, which appears to be felt.  He has sat in frot of the same or a very similar curtain in a number of other recent video messages including Days with the Imam: Part 1, released November 15 of last year, The Glory of the East Begins with Damascus, released July 27, and And the Defeats of the Americans Continue, released October 11.  The background setting of the AQC amir’s location suggests that the video segment featuring him was recorded fairly recently, within the last seven months.

Godane, as Al-Shabab’s amir, declares his loyalty to “our amir,” the “beloved amir, the blessed/honorable shaykh,” al-Zawahiri.  During his audio segment, a static background identifies Godane as the speaker and includes a still photograph from the conference in December 2010 at which Al-Shabab announced the joining to it of Hizbul Islam, the Somali Islamist insurgent group formerly headed by Hasan Dahir Aweys, who is now a senior Al-Shabab leader.

The issuing of this announcement now, during a period when both AQC and Al-Shabab are facing mounting pressures, is telling.  It is unclear at the current time who initiated this formal affiliation of Al-Shabab with AQC, or whether it was mutually initiated.  AQC, faced with the loss of its founder, Usama bin Laden, and a senior operational leader and ideologue, ‘Atiyyatullah al-Libi (Jamal Ibrahim Ishtaywi al-Misrati), last year is reeling from losses inflicted by U.S. drone missile strikes and is struggling to remain a relevant force.  Of the two groups, it arguably has the most to gain from formalizing its relationship with Al-Shabab, which continues to control vast swaths of territory in central and southern Somalia.  The insurgent movement or its allies also reportedly have made significant inroads into parts of northern Somalia, both in the autonomous region of Puntland and a contested area between Puntland and the self-declared republic of Somaliland.  Despite significant military setbacks since last spring, Al-Shabab remains a potent force within the country and its military power, even if it is in decline, remains the subject of pride for the Sunni jihadi current.  With the exception of Ansar al-Shari‘a, which is at the very least affiliated with AQAP, no other AQC affiliate controls any significant amount of territory.  The jihadi-insurgent “golden age” in Iraq from 2003 to 2007, during which AQ in the Land of the Two Rivers, the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Shura Council), its successor the Islamic State of Iraq, controlled villages and cities in certain regions, such as Al-Anbar, has long since ended.  The control and governance of territory has long been a transnational jihadi dream and Al-Shabab’s exercise of governing authority, however basic, over large parts of southern and central Somalia is thus something that AQC leaders and transnational jihadis online have long heralded as one of the best examples of what a “jihadi state” can accomplish.  Despite its delusions of grandeur with the Islamic State of Iraq, which, in terms of its actual ability to exercise significant governing authority over territory, exists mostly on paper rather than in practice, the transnational jihadi current’s attention has been shifting away from Iraq and toward other theaters, such as Somalia.

AQC leaders, from Bin Laden to al-Zawahiri to Abu Yahya al-Libi, have long held up Al-Shabab as a source of pride to the transnational jihadi current.  During its heyday from roughly 2008 through the summer of 2010, Al-Shabab represented, for both AQ, broadly defined, ideologues and online jihadis one of the best examples of what can be accomplished, in terms of controlling and governing territory, by “steadfast mujahideen” with few resources in the face of a numerically and technologically-superior set of adversaries, in this case AMISOM, Ethiopia, and their U.S. backers.  This was highlighted, for example, by Abu Yahya al-Libi in Al-Sahab’s 2008 “9/11 anniversary” video, The Results of Seven Years of the Crusades, and he more recently argued that the Kenyan military intervention in Somalia is a step on the way to victory for the “mujahideen” since it will lead to further economic catastrophe for Kenya and the U.S.  AQAP’s deputy amir, Sa’id al-Shihri, also praised Al-Shabab in a February 2010 audio message in which he urged increased cooperation between the two groups.

The fact that Al-Shabab’s successes in Somalia were only made possible by a unique set of circumstances that do not exist and are likely not reproducible in other regions seems not to have been considered by them.  In other words, Al-Shabab’s success at capturing and holding territory has provided AQ and other likeminded jihadis with hope that it is possible for “mujahideen” to implement “God’s rule,” a harsh implementation of a rudimentary form of shari‘a, and act as executors of a kind of state power.

Anwar al-‘Awlaqi, the late American militant preacher affiliated with AQAP who was killed in a U.S. drone missile strike on September 30, was perhaps the most outspoken in his view that Al-Shabab represents the potential of a jihadi state.  In a December 21, 2008 post on his blog, he lauded and congratulated Al-Shabab for its victories in Somalia against the Ethiopians, AMISOM, and the TFG, writing that they filled “our hearts with immense joy.”  He went on to describe Al-Shabab’s project in Somalia as a “university” that “will graduate” distinguished alumni who can share their experiences with and educate other “mujahideen” in implementing a similar social and governing program in other regions.  The Somali theater, he wrote, “will provide its graduates with the hands-on experience that the Ummah greatly needs for its next stage.”

Al-‘Awlaqi reiterated his positive assessment of Al-Shabab in his first, and thus far only publicly released, interview with AQAP’s Al-Malahem Media Foundation, which was released in May 2010.  When asked to clarify his position on the Somali insurgent movement, he said, “The various Islamic movements are searching for a solution for the Ummah, as are the scholars…Today we are seeing the solution in front of our very eyes in Somalia.  This small hand of mujahideen, with limited resources, has been able to establish a state and rule with God’s almighty Shari‘a.  Today, they are providing solutions for the people…Today, they are dealing with the realities and providing solutions from the Islamic Shari ‘a.  For this reason, as I mentioned, this is a unique experience from which the Ummah must derive benefit.”  Clearly, this is a heavily selective description of Al-Shabab’s execution of governing authority over wide swaths of Somalia.  However, al-‘Awlaqi’s response clearly shows how important the Somali theater has been to jihadis as a model to emulate.

SEE HERE FOR A VIDEO CLIP OF ANWAR AL-’AWLAQI’S DESCRIPTION OF AL-SHABAB.

Despite Al-Shabab’s importance in illustrating how a jihadi state can be run in praxis, the movement’s leaders have not been as frequently cited in videos produced by AQC and its affiliates as the reverse.  An audio clip of Godane was used in Ghazwat al-Mansura, a video in AQIM’s series The Shade of Swords, released on July 22, 2010, to my knowledge for the first, and so far only, time.

For its part, Al-Shabab has for a long time closely affiliated itself ideologically with AQC and the transnational jihadi current in the hope of garnering benefits from this relationship that would otherwise not be available to it.  This has been particularly true in terms of the movement winning financial support and potentially new recruits from outside of Somalia, particularly when the number of diaspora recruits from North America and Western Europe began to slow following the Ethiopian military withdrawal in January 2008.

Mukhtar Robow

Al-Shabab from its early stages embraced and has been strongly influenced by the charismatic persona of Bin Laden.  His image and clips of his audio and video messages have been used in the insurgent movement’s video productions since at least 2008.  For example, his image and audio clips of him were used prominently in Al-Shabab’s video series Martyrdom Operations in Somalia.  Insurgent leaders, from Godane to Mukhtar “Abu Mansur” Robow, ‘Ali Mahamoud Rage (‘Ali Dheere), and Hasan Dahir Aweys have continuously spoken with great affinity for Bin Laden and the late AQC founder continues to occupy a place of prominence in Al-Shabab’s media productions.  The insurgent movement held a major conference entitled “We Are all Usama” in mid-May following his killing in Pakistan.  Senior Al-Shabab leaders including Aweys, Robow, Fu’ad Muhammad Khalaf “Shongole,” and its governor of the Banaadir region, Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman, and ‘Abd al-Qadir Mu’min were present, as was American member Omar “Abu Mansur al-Amriki” Hammami.

Hasan Dahir Aweys

The clearest example of Al-Shabab’s ideological affinity for Bin Laden is a 48-minute video entitled Labbayk Ya Usama, which translates approximately to, “We Heed Your Call” or “At Your Service,” released on September 20, 2009 by Al-Shabab’s media wing.  In the video, Godane refers to Bin Laden, whom he calls by his kunya Abu ‘Abdullah, as “shaykh-i-na wa amir-i-na” (our shaykh and our amir).  Godane and other Al-Shabab leaders, such as Robow, Rage, and Aweys, have long described Bin Laden as the epitome of Muslim resistance to Western imperialism, epitomized by the United States, and its local clients such as Somalia’s TFG.

Insurgent ideological affinity for the transnational jihadism represented by AQC has not been limited to the personage of Bin Laden.  Al-Shabab’s media apparatus, originally called simply “Media Department” and now the “Al-Kata’ib (The Brigades) Media Foundation,” has also made frequent use of video and audio clips from other prominent transnational jihadi ideologues including Al-Qa’ida Central’s Abu Yahya al-Libi (a clip of whom appears in an early Al-Shabab media production, the July 2008 Al-Shabab video eulogy for its founder, Adan Hashi Farah ‘Ayro), the late Al-Qa’ida Central commander in Afghanistan Mustafa Abu’l Yazid, and Al-Qa’ida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq leaders Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (after which it named a research institute that published one issue of its Internet magazine Millat Ibrahim), Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.  Materials studied by Al-Shabab fighters and missionaries, at academies named after ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, include, in addition to classical and medieval books on Arabic grammar, Qur’anic commentaries, books of hadith, and prophetic biography, books by Ayman al-Zawahiri (al-Wala’ wa’l Bara’) and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Millat Ibrahim).

In addition to the significant ideological affinity that Al-Shabab’s leaders have for Bin Laden and other transnational jihadi ideologues, the former also get strategic benefit from their affiliation with Al-Qa’ida and the transnational jihadi community it represents.  By distributing its media materials on major jihadi Internet forums through the Global Islamic Media Front and embracing Bin Laden and other jihadi leaders, Al-Shabab is able to reach a broader audience of potential and actual supporters than it would otherwise be able to.  In tandem with its recruitment networks in East Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America, this has enabled it to win new supporters, some of whom have traveled to Somalia in order to join the movement.  It is important to note, however, that Al-Shabab maintains multiple tiers of media communication and messaging: (1) media aimed at transnational jihadis online, (2) Somali domestic and diaspora audiences via Somali language media outlets, which are as or more important than #1, (3) communications aimed at external enemies, for example via the “HSM Press” Twitter account and some of Al-Kata’ib’s videos.

On the operational front, AQC operatives in East Africa played a key role in training and providing ideological guidance to Al-Shabab in its formative days, though their exact roles remain hazy.  Chief among these operatives were Abu Talha al-Sudani (killed in 2007 or 2008), Saleh ‘Ali Saleh al-Nabhani (killed in a U.S. military strike in southern Somalia on September 14, 2009), and Fazul ‘Abdullah Muhammad, also known as Fadil Harun (killed in a chance encounter in June 2001 at a Transitional Federal Government checkpoint in Mogadishu).  Of the three, al-Nabhani occupied the most visible role in aiding Al-Shabab, appearing in a 24-minute video released by Al-Shabab’s media department in August 2008 in which he called on Muslims outside of Somalia to come and aid “their brothers” in that country.  He made specific calls to Muslims in Sudan and Yemen, saying that “we are waiting for reinforcements from Sudan and Yemen, the places of wisdom (al-hikmah) and faith (al-iman).”  Al-Nabhani is shown briefly instructing military exercises alongside Mukhtar Robow in the video.  A day after al-Nabhani’s death, Al-Shabab issued a statement eulogizing him.

During a period of severe crisis in which it is dealing with the effects of a severe famine, declining diaspora financial and manpower support, and growing military pressures from AMISOM, the TFG, Ethiopia, Kenya, their allied militias, and the U.S., Al-Shabab may be wagering that by formally affiliating itself with AQC it will receive financial support or recruits that it may otherwise not have had access to.  Questions remain, however, as to the timing of this announcement.  AQC likely has little spare financial support or manpower that it can send to Al-Shabab, given the former’s needs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If it was hoping for another safe haven in Somalia, AQC will likely be disappointed in Somalia since the “golden age” of Al-Shabab’s insurgent state is likely over.  However, it may not be direct AQC support that Al-Shabab is aiming for but rather support from non-Somali jihadis who are sympathetic to AQC’s ideological message who may choose Somalia as their field of “jihad” and thus provide the insurgent movement with badly needed reinforcements.

On the operational level, it is unclear whether AQC still has key operatives in East Africa.  The group’s original core group of operatives has died or been killed, likely leaving a vacuum that will be difficult for AQC to fill, particularly given its weakened state and need for all the financial and manpower resources it can get for the Afghanistan-Pakistan front.  The only suspected AQC operative that has been revealed publicly since the chance killing of Fazul ‘Abdullah Muhammad at a TFG checkpoint in Mogadishu on June 8 of last year, has been Abu ‘Abdullah al-Muhajir, who the FBI believes to be American citizen Jehad Serwan Mostafa.  He was present at a major media event staged in October by Al-Shabab and AQC at the insurgent movement’s flagship refugee camp, Al-Yasir, in the Lower Shabelle region, which has since been closed.  The masked al-Muhajir delivered humanitarian and other aid to Al-Yasir.  On banners present at the event, the identities of “AQ” and Al-Shabab were kept distinct and separate.  The aid was labeled as being from “AQ” but distributed in coordination with Al-Shabab.  Al-Muhajir’s exact role in AQC, if any, have not yet been specified in any detail by the group, nor was the aid distribution discussed in any detail, at least yet, in AQC media releases.  Without significant infrastructure in the form of skilled operatives in Somalia, it is unlikely that the official announcement of Al-Shabab’s affiliation with AQC will bring about any immediate significant changes on the ground for the insurgent movement.  The official announcement of affiliation does, however, potentially provide AQC with a propaganda coup in that it is able to continue presenting itself as relevant and it could also provide a new cause for its supporters to unify around.

‘Ali Mahamoud Rage (left) with Abu ‘Abdullah al-Muhajir at Al-Yasir camp in Lower Shabelle in mid-October

Al-Shabab is also likely to remain focused on the ongoing conflict inside Somalia, though it will also likely continue to carry out attacks in Kenya and other neighboring countries that either have soldiers inside the country or have sent soldiers to join the AMISOM force.  Given the reportedly high numbers of non-Somali foreign fighters that have joined its ranks (numbers remain unclear), it is possible that as Al-Shabab becomes increasingly desperate it will attempt to carry out more attacks against countries that are militarily engaged in Somalia.  Al-Shabab has already, it seems, solidified an operational relationship with militant elements within the Kenyan Muslim population and it is likely that Al-Shabab has already and will continue to attempt to form relationships with other Muslim militant groups in the Horn of Africa.  It is important to note that, unlike other AQC affiliates with the exception of AQAP and Ansar al-Shari‘a in Yemen, Al-Shabab has a significant domestic population over which it rules, a constituency so to speak, though clearly not all of the people support the movement’s rule.  Domestic politics and social relations will likely continue to play a major role, if not the most important role, in determining Al-Shabab’s trajectory.

Al-Shabab is a hybrid movement, part domestic insurgency and part jihadi movement with a transnational flare.  It is a “glocal” militant movement that, while focused mainly on waging a domestic insurgency, has deliberately cultivated relations with AQC, AQAP, and the transnational jihadi current which they represent, in part due to real ideological affinity and in for strategic reasons, mainly to expand its limited base of potential recruits and supporters.  Its desire and ability to move fully into the transnational arena, defined here as outside Somalia and the Horn of Africa, remains an open question.  It is possible that the movement will be ultimately uninterested in or incapable of, like AQIM, of moving fully into transnational militancy.  Al-Shabab, despite facing major setbacks during the past year, has succeeded in establishing clandestine recruiting networks on several continents, developed a sophisticated set of media operations, and continues to prove that it remains a potent force inside Somalia, though how long it can remain so under increasing military pressure is unclear.

The possibility of fractures emerging in the movement, particularly as pressure mounts, remain perhaps the greatest danger to Al-Shabab’s existence as a unified, or fairly unified, militant force inside the country.  These fractures will perhaps emerge following the formal affiliation of Al-Shabab with AQC, if consistent reports of a rift between Godane and more Somalia-centric Al-Shabab leaders are true.  These fractures, however, may not emerge in the short term, as the insurgent movement has proven remarkably resilient in the fact of major crises such as the famine.  The Al-Shabab media reaction, in the form of its own press statements, videos, and other media releases, to the official announcement of affiliation will also be telling with regard to how the insurgent movement itself, and not AQC, presents the affiliation.  It also remains to be seen whether the distribution network of Al-Shabab media materials online changes, moving from the Sada al-Jihad (Echo of Jihad) Media Center of the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) to the Al-Fajr (The Dawn) Media Center, which distributes AQC, AQAP, ISI, and AQIM media materials exclusively, in addition to some of its own material.  Even close allies of AQC in other regions, such as the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, do not have their media materials distributed via Al-Fajr.  Such a shift would be a further sign of Al-Shabab’s full adoption into the AQ family.

As the idiom says, “watch this space.”

Iran, al-Qaeda, and missing information

Late last month, Foreign Affairs magazine ran a rather surprising article from Seth Jones, the RAND political scientist and well-regarded scholar of American military tactics, titled simply “Al-Qaeda in Iran.” Surprising not for what the article reveals, but for what it fails to fully analyze, and what it misses entirely.

For one thing, I have a hard time understanding the first two words of Jones’ piece, that the presence since 2001 of senior al-Qaeda members in Iran has gone “virtually unnoticed.” For one thing, the topic has been common knowledge and conversation fodder among counterterrorism specialists for years, some of whom, like Leah Farrall wrote publicly about Iran’s detention and harboring of al-Qaeda figures and historical fellow-travelers. But as Jones hints (and Josh Foust explicitly lays out), the U.S. government has in recent years taken increasing public action to draw attention to the connection; in the summer of 2009 the Treasury Department slapped sanctions on Osama bin Laden’s son Sa’ad, as well as three other suspected al-Qaeda members, stating clearly that Sa’ad and others were believed to be in Iran. And last summer Treasury stepped up the pressure (and rhetoric), designating six al-Qaeda figures for sanctions and publicly accusing Iran of having forged a “secret deal” with al-Qaeda, one that in the words of Treasury official David S. Cohen allowed the terror group to “funnel funds and operatives through [Iranian] territory.”

Digging into the details of the piece, I was disappointed to find that, well, there aren’t very many of them. Jones only names a limited number of people actually believed to be in Iran, including the figures on what he terms al-Qaeda’s “management council” in Iran — Saif al-Adel, Sulayman Abu Ghayth, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani — as well as Yasin al-Suri, who Jones calls an al-Qaeda facilitator. While  al-Suri and Abu al-Khayr aren’t exactly household names, al-Adel, Abu Ghayth, Abu Hafs, and Abu Muhammad are all long-time al-Qaeda figures, and the first three should be known to anyone who has even given a cursory study to al-Qaeda’s history before and after the 9/11 attacks (and again, their suspected presence in Iran has long been noted by specialists and journalists alike).

The second major fault of this piece is that, despite having “culled through hundreds of documents from the Harmony database at West Point; perused hundreds more open-source and declassified documents, such as the U.S. Department of Treasury’s sanctions against al Qaeda leaders in Iran; and interviewed government officials from the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia” Jones doesn’t acknowledge the widespread reports that circulated in 2010 that al-Adel, Abu Ghayth, and Abu Hafs had quietly been allowed to leave Iran. While these reports may not be conclusive, the possible departure of such key leaders from Iran seems to be too important of a data point to simply ignore.

Moreover, last fall Mauritanian news sources suddenly reported that the family of Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, whose real name is Mahfouz Ould Walid, had been repatriated to Mauritania and were being debriefed by Mauritanian officials. Admittedly, there aren’t many people who make it a regular habit to peruse the Mauritanian press. But this information was and is available online, and I personally know a number of lay analysts and former intelligence analysts who not only saw this information, but talked about it publicly on forums like Twitter. It is one thing to allow personnel to travel freely, but another altogether to give up the leverage gained by holding on to an al-Qaeda leader’s family. However, because this information does not make it into Jones’ article, its impact cannot be addressed.

Setting aside these concerns, Jones’ analysis of the relationship between Iran and al-Qaeda falls short on other key points. While he argues (and I agree) that “It would be unwise to overestimate the leverage Tehran has over al Qaeda’s leadership” and that al-Qaeda “is no Iranian puppet” Jones argues that in the event of an American or Israeli attack, Iran could step up its material support for al-Qaeda and “could turn to al Qaeda to mount a retaliation to any U.S. or Israeli attack.”

This assertion smacks of contradiction, though no analyst can predict the future hypothetical reaction of Iran and al-Qaeda to a hypothetical U.S. or Israeli strike. But history lends this argument no credence, and Jones gives no evidence to back up his own eventuality. While al-Qaeda’s capabilities are open to debate, the organization has not managed to even link itself to a successful attack against the West since the 2005 London transport bombings. And al-Qaeda core has never managed to stage an attack against Israel — though groups inspired by al-Qaeda have succeeded in a limited fashion, while others paid a heavy price for their allegiance.

Moreover, while some believe al-Adel has played an increasing operational role in al-Qaeda since 2010, major al-Qaeda plots in recent years, including the 2009 New York Subway bomb plot and the 2010 “Dussëldorf Cell” plot in Germany involved senior al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan’s tribal areas. As Paul Cruickshank has detailed, al-Qaeda operatives in the tribal areas have played a major role in training foreign fighters and plotting attacks against the West even as drone strikes decimated the group’s leadership, though this may change following the deaths of crucially important figures like Attiyatullah Abu Abd al-Rahman. Yet the point remains that al-Qaeda’s leadership in Iran have not been essential players in plots against the West since 9/11, and Jones does not show why this center of gravity would necessarily shift to Iran, even if the Ayatollahs or Mahmoud Ahmedinejad decided that it should.

Despite the time I’ve spent directly critiquing Jones here, my point here is not to attack him, but rather to show the importance of dealing with al-Qaeda’s history, especially since 9/11, in analyzing what the group may do next and how they will continue to operate in a post-bin Laden world. While much of this is classified, there is still a tremendous wealth of information in the open-source, and there is still no substitute for careful unclassified research. And perhaps, from time to time, you should check the Mauritanian papers.

Jabhat al-Nusrah and Jihad in Syria

While debates ramped up over the past two weeks among Middle East specialists over the efficacy of a possible Western intervention in Syria (see here, here, and here), earlier this week, on January 23, the online global jihadi forums posted — in jubilation — a new video message ”For the People of Syria from the Mujahidin of Syria in the Fields of Jihad” from a purported new jihadi group named Jabhat al-Nusrah (The Victory Front) via its new media outlet al-Manarah al-Bayda’ (The White Lighthouse) Foundation for Media Production. Before this article discusses the video and reaction to it from Abu Basir al-Tartusi, a Syrian exiled in London, it is worthwhile to look deeper into the significance for why Jabhat al-Nusrah chose al-Manarah al-Bayda’ as the name of its media outlet. The answer is quite fascinating.

al-Fitan wa Ashrat as-Sa’ah

Although many do not look into it, there are many layers usually to why jihadis decide to choose names for their media outlets, forums, battalions, and titles for media releases. On many occasions they allude to historical figures, events, or places as well as allusions to Qur’anic verses and Ahadith. One area that is understudied is the role of millenarianism in jihadi thought. Ali Soufan covered aspects of it related to the black banners and Khurasan in his book The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda. Indeed, the name of Jabhat al-Nusrah’s media outlet al-Manarah al-Bayda’ alludes to a Sahih Muslim hadith #7015, which deals with the end of times. The whole hadith is long so I placed the entirety of it at the bottom of this article, but here is the segment that mentions al-Manarah al-Bayda’:

He (Dajjal) would then call (that young man) and he will come forward laughing with his face gleaming (with happiness) and it would at this very time that Allah would send Jesus, son of Mary, and he will descend at al-Manarah al-Bayda’ (the white lighthouse or minaret) in the eastern side of Damascus wearing two garments lightly dyed with saffron and placing his hands on the wings of two Angels. When he would lower his head, there would fall beads of perspiration from his head, and when he would raise it up, beads like pearls would scatter from it. Every non-believer who would smell the odour of his self would die and his breath would reach as far as he would be able to see. He would then search for him (Dajjal) until he would catch hold of him at the gate of Ludd and would kill him. Then a people whom Allah had protected would come to Jesus, son of Mary, and he would wipe their faces and would inform them of their ranks in Paradise and it would be under such conditions that Allah would reveal to Jesus these words: I have brought forth from amongst My servants such people against whom none would be able to fight; you take these people safely to Tur, and then Allah would send Gog and Magog and they would swarm down from every slope.

The ad-Dajjal figure mentioned in the above quote of the hadith represents a false prophet that comes during the end of times. It is similar to the anti-Christ, but somewhat different at the same time. Islamic tradition states that there are several ad-Dajjal throughout history, but during the end times it is considered the “big” ad-Dajjal (false prophet). According to Jean-Pierre Filiu in his book Apocalypse in Islam, “Throughout the whole of human history, from Adam until the resurrection, no thing or person will have caused greater turmoil than ad-Dajjal.” Additionally, al-Manarah al-Bayda’ or as local Damascenes call it the “Jesus Minaret,” refers to the eastern minaret at the Ummayyad Mosque, also called the Great Mosque of Damascus.

Jabhat al-Nusrah does not directly mention anything related to the hadith and its significance in its video, but it is difficult for one not to wonder about the deeper meaning. As a result of the currently tumultuous situation in Syria and the centrality of Syria in the Islamic apocalyptic literature one would be remiss not to ponder that individuals involved with Jabhat al-Nusrah have the apocalypse on their minds. At the same time, it should be noted that millenarianism is often important for many religious hardliner groups. Without direct knowledge of why Jabhat al-Nusrah chose the name al-Manarah al-Bayda’ for its media outlet,  it is difficult to ascertain its true intent. Understanding this extra layer, though, and its significance in Islamic traditional literature can hopefully provide deeper insights into Jabhat al-Nusrah’s state of their mind versus parsing the banal platitudes they actually discuss in the video.

The Video and Tartusi’s Take

The video Jabhat al-Nusrah released was around sixteen minutes and contained pretty high quality graphics showing that its media department (or one dude in a basement) definitely has some level of skills. For about 5-8 minutes of the video there is an individual named al-Fatih (“The Conquerer) Abu Muhammad al-Juwlani, Jabhat al-Nusrah’s spokesperson. More or less, al-Juwlani repeats the usual jihadi tropes. He also calls out and threatens the United States, the West, the Arab League, Turkey, and Iran for all aligning and collaborating with the al-Assad regime against the (Sunni) Muslims. There are multiples scenes of tens of individuals training with AK-47s in the woods and desert. They also take pose pictures together with large flags with the shahadah (Muslim testament of faith) on it along with either the name Jabhat al-Nusrah at the bottom or an area of operation, including Hamah. Dara is also mentioned by a small cadre pledging loyalty to the group. In a separate video that was released a few days after the official release from Jabhat al-Nusrah, a video was uploaded to YouTube that showed a small group of individuals declaring fealty to Jabhat al-Nusrah. They claim to be from Idlib and go under the banner of Kata’ib Ahrar ash-Sham (The Battalion of Free Syria). If the number of people in the videos can tell us anything, between the YouTube video and the official release there are probably at the low end twenty and at the high end forty individuals involved with Jabhat al-Nusrah.

Usually, when new groups like Jabhat al-Nusrah appear, some online grassroots jihadi activists are curious about the group’s program, legitimacy, and whether it is okay to support them. Although such questions haven’t been asked of Minbar at-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad’s Shari’ah Committee yet, Abu Basir al-Tartusi was asked by several “brothers” about Jabhat al-Nusrah and its video message on his Facebook page al-Mu’ardah al-Islamiyyah l-l-Nizam al-Suri (The Islamic Opposition to the Syrian Regime). al-Tartusi responded by stating he had never heard of them, but had a few observations and reservations about the group. One of al-Tartusi’s larger critiques was the fact that the men in the video and specifically, the speaker, were all masked and did not show their faces, while Syrians have removed its fear of the al-Assad regime by defying the taghut (tyrant). al-Tartusi also reminds Jabhat al-Nusrah of what happened in the 1980s, which led to much bloodshed and that the mujahidin should be reassuring the masses instead of provoking fear by hiding behind masks. al-Tartusi understands that for the mujahidins safety some have to cover their faces, but a leader needs to show itself, which could hopefully help the masses sympathize with its cause. He also warns that they need to have patience, especially with the Syrians that are looking for international support. Therefore, Jabhat al-Nusrah must show kindness.

al-Tartusi also blasts Jabhat al-Nusrah for proclaiming war against “enemies East and West … it will not benefit the Syrian revolution.” It will only open the mujahidin up to more fronts and greater chance of failure. This harkens back to previous tracts by al-Tartusi on the Syrian uprising, which Joas Wagemakers touches upon at Jihadica. As Wagemakers noted: “What is clear from Abu Basir’s writings, however, is that he obviously cares about Syria. The tone of his work here is not one of fighting against ‘infidel’ rulers who fail to apply the shari’a but much more one of concern for his native land.” It appears al-Tartusi is still most concerned with the goal of seeking the al-Assad regime’s fall. Further echoing the above sentiment, al-Tartusi wonders why parts of the Jabhat al-Nusrah video is translated to English, who are they trying to speak to (al-Tartusi rhetorically asks): the US and the West or the Syrian people? Although he has many questions, al-Tartusi hopes his advice with be fruitful for the mujahidin and that they succeed.

As such, although Jabhat al-Nusrah does not appear to have large support yet, they are a group that one should keep an eye on, especially when thinking in the context of a potential Western intervention. There is much we do not know about Jabhat al-Nusrah, but again, as in other contexts of the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, it has provided space for more radical elements to breathe as regimes attempt to hold on at the center while allowing the periphery to fall out of sight. Of course, that does not mean one should support these authoritarian regimes, but rather, one should be aware of the potential short and medium term consequences that citizens of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as policymakers in the West will have to grapple with in the coming years and decade.

–

Sahih Muslim 7015:

An-Nawwas b. Sam’an reported that Allah’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) made a mention of the Dajjal one day in the morning. He sometimes described him to be insignificant and sometimes described (his turmoil) as very significant rand we felt) as if he were in the cluster of the date-palm trees. When we went to him (to the Holy Prophet) in the evening and he read (the signs of fear) in our faces, he said: What is the matter with you?

We said: Allah’s Messenger, you made a mention of the Dajjal in the morning (sometimes describing him) to be insignificant and sometimes very important, until we began to think as if he were present in some (near) part of the cluster of the datpalm trees. Thereupon he said: I harbour fear in regard to you in so many other things besides the Dajjal. If he comes forth while I am among on, I shall contend with him on your behalf, but if he comes forth while I am not amongst you, a man must contend on his own behalf and Allah would take care of every Muslim on my behalf (and safeguard him against his evil). He (Dajjal) would be a young man with twisted, contracted hair, and a blind eye. I compare him to ‘Abd-ul-’Uzza b. Qatan. He who amongst you would survive to see him should recite over him the opening verses of Sura Kahf (xviii.). He would appear on the way between Syria and Iraq and would spread mischief right and left. O servant of Allah! adhere (to the path of Truth). We said: Allah’s Messenger, how long would he stay on the earth? He said.. For forty days, one day like a year and one day like a month and one day like a week and the rest of the days would be like your days.

We said: Allah’s Messenger, would one day’s prayer suffice for the prayers of day equal to one year? Thereupon he said: No, but you must make an estimate of time (and then observe prayer). We said: Allah’s Messenger, how quickly would he walk upon the earth? Thereupon he said: Like cloud driven by the wind. He would come to the people and invite them (to a wrong religion) and they would affirm their faith in him and respond to him. He would then give command to the sky and there would be rainfall upon the earth and it would grow crops. Then in the evening, their posturing animals would come to them with their humps very high and their udders full of milk and their flanks stretched. He would then come to another people and invite them. But they would reject him and he would go away from them and there would be drought for them and nothing would be lef t with them in the form of wealth. He would then walk through the waste, land and say to it: Bring forth your treasures, and the treasures would come out and collect (themselves) before him like the swarm of bees. He would then call a person brimming with youth and strike him with the sword and cut him into two pieces and (make these pieces lie at a distance which is generally) between the archer and his target.

He would then call (that young man) and he will come forward laughing with his face gleaming (with happiness) and it would at this very time that Allah would send Christ, son of Mary, and he will descend at the white minaret in the eastern side of Damscus wearing two garments lightly dyed with saffron and placing his hands on the wings of two Angels. When he would lower his head, there would fall beads of perspiration from his head, and when he would raise it up, beads like pearls would scatter from it. Every non-believer who would smell the odour of his self would die and his breath would reach as far as he would be able to see. He would then search for him (Dajjal) until he would catch hold of him at the gate of Ludd and would kill him. Then a people whom Allah had protected would come to Jesus, son of Mary, and he would wipe their faces and would inform them of their ranks in Paradise and it would be under such conditions that Allah would reveal to Jesus these words: I have brought forth from amongst My servants such people against whom none would be able to fight; you take these people safely to Tur, and then Allah would send Gog and Magog and they would swarm down from every slope.

The first of them would pass the lake of Tibering and drink out of it. And when the last of them would pass, he would say: There was once water there. Jesus and his companions would then be besieged here (at Tur, and they would be so much hard pressed) that the head of the ox would be dearer to them than one hundred dinirs and Allah’s Apostle, Jesus, and his companions would supplicate Allah, Who would send to them insects (which would attack their necks) and in the morning they would perish like one single person. Allah’s Apostle, Jesus, and his companions would then come down to the earth and they would not find in the earth as much space as a single span which is not filled with their putrefaction and stench. Allah’s Apostle, Jesus, and his companions would then again beseech Allah, Who would send birds whose necks would be like those of bactrin camels and they would carry them and throw them where God would will. Then Allah would send rain which no house of clay or (the tent of) camels’ hairs would keep out and it would wash away the earth until it could appear to be a mirror. Then the earth would be told to bring forth its fruit and restore its blessing and, as a result thereof, there would grow (such a big) pomegranate that a group of persons would be able to eat that, and seek shelter under its skin and milch cow would give so much milk that a whole party would be able to drink it. And the milch camel would give such (a large quantity of) milk that the whole tribe would be able to drink out of that and the milch sheep would give so much milk that the whole family would be able to drink out of that and at that time Allah would send a pleasant wind which would soothe (people) even under their armpits, and would take the life of every Muslim and only the wicked would survive who would commit adultery like asses and the Last Hour would come to them.

IN PICTURES: Somalia’s Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, a Photo Essay Sourced from Insurgent Media: Part 4

-Christopher Anzalone (McGill University)

A photo essay on the Somali insurgent movement Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen
Part 1 can be viewed HERE.

Part 2 can be viewed HERE.

Part 3 can be viewed HERE.

_____________________________________

‘Abd al-Qadir Mu’min meeting with Murusade clan leaders (April 2011)

‘Ali Mahamoud Rage (Ali Dheere) at graduation of Jaysh al-Hisbah, Harakat al-Shabab’s police force, members in Lower Shabelle (Feb. 2011)

‘Ali Mahamoud Rage (Ali Dheere) with captured Burundian AMISOM equipment at Dayniile

‘Ali Mahamoud Rage (Ali Dheere) at graduation of Jaysh al-Hisbah, Harakat al-Shabab’s police force, members  in Lower Shabelle (Feb. 2011)

A shari’a court run by Harakat al-Shabab in Lower Shabelle

Distribution of Aid by Jaysh al-’Usrah (Sep. 2011), Harakat al-Shabab’s front line military force

Distribution of Aid by Jaysh al-’Usrah (Sep. 2011), Harakat al-Shabab’s front line military force

Bay & Bakool clan leaders at meeting with Harakat al-Shabab officials in Baidoa (July 2011)

Celebration for the Children of the Martyrs in Lower Shabelle (September 2011)

Children attending a graduation ceremony of new trainees of Harakat al-Shabab’s police force, Jaysh al-Hisbah, in February 2011

Hasan Dahir Aweys at Al-Yasir Camp, Lower Shabelle (July 2011)

Muhammad Abu ‘Abdullah (far right), Harakat al-Shabab’s governor of Lower Shabelle, at an Eid al-Adha celebration in Marka (Nov. 2011)

Muhammad Abu ‘Abdullah, visit to Lower Shabelle camp (Sep. 2011)

Muhammad Abu ‘Abdullah, Harakat al-Shabab’s governor of Lower Shabelle, at graduation of Jaysh al-Hisbah members in Lower Shabelle (Feb. 2011)

Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman, Harakat al-Shabab’s governor of Banaadir, with captured military equipment in Dayniile on the outskirts of Mogadishu (October 2011)

Harakat al-Shabab preacher-ideologues Fu’ad Muhammad Khalaf “Shongole” (left) and ‘Abd al-Qaadir Mu’min (in green scarf) on a visit to a refugee camp in Lower Shabelle in September 2011

Suldaan Al Muhammad, the former head of Harakat al-Shabab’s Emergency Relief Committee and head of its Zakat Office, which oversees the collection and distribution of the charity required of financially capable Muslims to aid the poor and other groups, such as soldiers,  at Al-Yasir camp, Lower Shabelle (Oct. 2011)

An Update to Hegghammer’s Preference-Based Analysis of Islamism

Much has been talked and written about in popular discourse regarding religion, Islam, and the rise of Islamists and Salafis following the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa during the past year. The elections in Tunisia and especially in Egypt upended some assumptions researchers have had regarding Salafi participation in elections. Prior to the elections in Egypt, the al-Nur Party was categorically against participation in elections. According to Salafi doctrine, democracy is considered a religion, a polytheistic one where legislators are idols that infringe upon God’s sole sovereignty over mankind. Of course, not all Salafis will necessarily break from this doctrine as al-Nur has. That said, it should make one pause when thinking about how one categorizes in a social scientific sense religious groups and religiously-inspired social movements. The uprisings have created a paradigm shift in some of the MENA societies, broken long-engrained taboos, and given space to previously unexposed ideas. It is quite possible that what one thought before regarding these movements may no longer apply or is analytically more fluid due to a change in circumstance and the potential to gain from it. Therefore, this short article hopes to look at these changes through the lens of Norwegian-based jihadism studies expert Thomas Hegghammer’s preference-based analysis of Islamism.

Methodology

As Hegghammer states, it is not perfect, but in terms of robustness it is the most analytically precise categorization that one has theorized. This article will address some of these flaws below, which will hopefully encourage broader debate. For now, this article will explain Hegghammer’s preference-based analysis of Islamism. There are five rationales and each has a violent and non-violent form. Here is the table Hegghammer used in his essay “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism,” in the edited volume Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement:

Rationale	Non-violent form		Violent form
	Manifestation	Examples	Manifestations	Examples
State-oriented	Reformism	MB, Saudi Sahwa	Socio-revolutionary activism	GIA, GSPC, EIJ
Nation-oriented	Nationalism		Violent irredentism	Hamas, LeT, Chechen mujahidin, Islamic Army (Iraq)
Ummah-oriented	Pan-Islamism	MWL	Classical jihadism Global jihadism	Arabs in Chechnya al-Qai‘da (AQ), QAP
Morality-oriented	Pietism	Tabligh, Madkhalis	Vigilantism	Unorganized hisba
Sectarian	Sectarianism		Violent sectarianism	Lashkar-e-Janghvi, Iraqi militias

Here are Hegghammer’s definitions of the above rationales:

State-oriented: Characterized by a desire to change the social and political organization of the state.

Nation-oriented: Defined by a desire to establish sovereignty on a specific territory perceived as occupied or dominated by non-Muslims.

Umma-oriented: Distinguished by a desire to protect the Islamic nation as a whole from external (non-Muslim) threats.

Morality-oriented: Characterized by a desire to change Muslims’ social conduct in a more conservative and literalist direction.

Sectarian-oriented: Defined by a desire to reduce the influence and power of the competing sect (Shi’i or Sunni).

Obsolete or Update?

Overall, Hegghammer’s categorization still provides an important jumping off point for how one can comprehend differences between differing Islamist movements. There are a few aspects that could be adjusted and updated to the realities of the past few years in the West and in the MENA. First, it may be worthwhile now for one to account for differences between governing Islamist actors and non-state Islamist actors. Therefore, parties such as the AKP in Turkey, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP; Muslim Brothers) in Egypt, and Ennahda in Tunisia as well as hybrid state/non-state actors like HAMAS in the Palestinian Territories and Hizbullah in Lebanon would be categorized in an alternative matter.

As it relates to non-state actors (since that is what the original categorization is based on), there is one group that does not quite fit the mold: Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT). Based on its ideology it should be considered ummah-oriented and non-violent meaning pan-Islamists, yet they are far different than the Muslim World League (MWL) in purpose and goal. Additionally, although different ideologically, in recent years, Western groups such as al-Muhajirun (AM) in the United Kingdom, Revolution Muslim (RM) in the United States, and Shari‘ah for Belgium (S4B) would fall under the same type of category as HuT. Similarly, with the onset of the MENA uprisings, new non-violent Salafi groups that focus locally, but sympathize with AQ’s global message such as Ansar al-Shari‘ah in Tunisia (AST) and al-Tali‘ah al-Salafiyyah al-Mujahidiyyah (TSM) in Egypt would fall under a similar preference-based categorization as HuT and the Western groups mentioned above. As such, similar to the violent form of the ummah-oriented categorization (classical and global jihadism), I propose that there should be a dual categorization for non-violent ummah-oriented pan-Islamists: systemic Pan-Islamists and anti-systemic Pan-Islamists. I would define them as such:

Systemic pan-Islamism: Interested in pan-Islamist causes, but accept and work within the current international system.

Anti-systemic pan-Islamism: Groups that are non-violent yet want to overthrow the current international system and world order.

Therefore, organizations such as the Muslim World League would be considered systemic pan-Islamists while the groups HuT, AM, RM, S4B, AST, and TSM would be categorized as non-systemic Pan-Islamists.

These are the basics of what could be a much longer/larger discussion and argument, but I wanted to put the main contours out there to see what others thought.

A look inside AQIM

One year ago last weekend, two young French men were seized from a restaurant in the middle of Niamey, Niger, and hustled quickly north towards Mali by members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Yet unlike the normal AQIM kidnapping, which ends in ransom demands and months of waiting, this kidnapping ended quickly and tragically, with an ambush just inside Mali by French Special Forces, and two dead hostages — longtime friends Antoine de Léocour and Vincent Delory. De Léocour was supposed to get married that week to a Nigerien woman, and Delory had just arrived in Niger for the wedding.

While the investigation into their deaths, initially attributed solely to their kidnappers by French authorities, quickly faded from the news, events this week have brought the incident back into the public eye in France. The paper Libération first broke the story Friday that a French anti-terrorism judge, Yves Jannier, interviewed in November 2011 a young AQIM member arrested in Nuakchott the previous February (his name is Mohamed al-Amine ould Mouhamedou ould M’Balle, known as “Mouawiya”).

And what a story Mouawiya told.

According to the reports, Mouawiya was part of the same katiba, or unit, as the men who took part in the kidnapping. He claims that the operation was carefully planned, and that the men of the unit rejoiced upon news that the two young Frenchmen had been seized. But then things went wrong as the three-car AQIM convoy crossed into Mali, and French helicopters carrying elite paratroopers struck. As Mouawiya tells it, the kidnappers tried to pull de Léocour from the car, but when he did not have the strength to follow an AQIM member named Faisal al-Jazairi, the latter coldly shot him several times. However, Mouawiya says, Delory was killed when the truck he was riding in, which was carrying gasoline, was shot at and burst into flames. Moreover, according to Mouawiya, AQIM did not fire the shots that set the truck on fire.

While we can’t be sure about the events as described by Mouawiya, this telling of the story fits with what AQIM said previously about the incident, and other evidence leaves some room for doubt in the official story; some months ago, France’s military released video of the rescue operation from an overhead surveillance plane, but 1 minute was omitted — the time in which Delory’s car burst into flames.

Delory’s family believes that the French army is responsible for at least his death, and allege that a lack of bulletproof vests and hastiness in staging the operation, which they believe may not have been solely a hostage-rescue operation, led to the Delory’s death. They are demanding a further investigation and possible charges of involuntary manslaughter. I’ll leave that debate for another blog post, though I will point out that that a French military source told Le Point defense writer Jean Guisnel that the operation, effected with incredible speed over great distances, was a “tactical, not strategic, failure.” This implies that one motivation for staging the helicopter raid was to deter further AQIM activity. To quote the source (my quick translation, with help from journalist Olivier Knox):

We needed to attempt this operation. The pros and cons were discussed. I’m not BS’ing you. I’ll tell you straight; if any little group can kidnap our compatriots living tranquilly in an African capital, we must put a stop to it. As soon as we had the capacity to react, we had to do it! Of course, to bring [the hostages] out alive would have been an absolute triumph. But it is to the credit of our of political leaders to to have acted as they did: their global responsibility leads them to privilege the national interest. In this affair, we have experienced a tactical failure, but I would not say the same thing on the strategic level.

Setting aside this brewing controversy, the rest of Mouawiya’s testimony seems to have passed into the news largely without commentary, testimony that is of great interest to anyone who’s ever spent time thinking about the internal structure and motivations of AQIM. And primarily, his comments help shed some light on the question of what AQIM in the Sahel really is – a jihadist organization that engages criminal activity, or a criminal organization masquerading as holy warriors.

Mouawiya, 22 when he was arrested last February, told the judge that his engagement with jihadist activities began in 2006, following a religious upbringing and a turn towards salafist ideas, jihadist hymns broadcast on the radio and poetry about famed jihadist leader Abdullah Azzam.  By 2007 he had joined AQIM at the instigation of a local religious leader, Ibrahim Ould Hannoud, which took him to a training camp near Timbuktu, in order to satisfy his desire to “wage jihad in conformity with the methods adopted by Osama bin Laden.” At the camp he trained with kalashnikov rifles, PK submachine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, Tokarev pistols, and even 12.7 mm DShK heavy machine guns.

He also disclosed some interesting details about his unit, led by the infamous “Mr. Marlboro” Mokhtar Belmokhtar (referred to in most of the pieces about Mouawiya by another name, Khaled Abou al-Abbes.) He says his unit comprised 40 individuals, mostly Algerians but with at least one other Mauritanian, and that they had several heavily-armed 4x4s, including at least one SAM-7 surface-to-ai missile, and around $5 million in cash gleaned from ransom payments. Interestingly, he seems to confirm what others have said about Belmokhtar, saying that MBM got along well with European hostages and treated them kindly, and that he also had little education in religious matters, but instead often talked about his great love of women.

Getting to the hostage-taking itself, Mouawiya told his interrogator that the information about the two young Frenchman’s precise location came from a Nigerian Boko Haram member. This fits with a story first reported by RFI last year that investigators supposedly found the number of a Boko Haram member and supposed “intermediary” with AQIM in cell phones carried by the kidnappers. While there has been much speculation about possible links between AQIM and Boko Haram, this information reinforces the existence of at least contacts between the group and some level of cooperation and information sharing, even if we still do not know about the extent of possible training of Boko Haram members by AQIM, or whether or not AQIM is helping supply the group with weapons, as has been alleged by the Nigerian and other governments in the past.

Yet something that is even more interesting to me (and something that seems to have gone unnoticed in media reports) is what Mouawiya’s testimony says about cooperation among AQIM’s Sahelian units. According to the timeline that the young jihadist laid out, in January 2011 he was in Gao, in northern Mali, part of the unit involved in this kidnapping in Niamey. Yet a month later, he was arrested in Nuakchott, due to his alleged involvement in a failed operation to infiltrate the Mauritanian capital with three explosives-laden trucks and attack the country’s president as well as the French embassy. Except that most AQIM specialists agree that that operation was handled by Khaled al-Chinguitti, a Mauritanian AQIM commander known to be close to Yahya Djuadi, who himself works closely with Abou Zeid, AQIM’s other key commander in the Sahel and a reputed rival of, you guessed it, Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

Now, reports about the rivalry between MBM and Abou Zeid go back several years, and Abou Zeid (along with Djuadi) were reportedly sent south to replace MBM as Emir in the Sahara sometime in 2009. But Mouawiya’s testimony implies that there is more cooperation amongst rival units than most people think, and that different units of the group are involved actively in both criminal and jihadist activities. This is not to say that these rivalries don’t exist, but I do think that this data point could show that AQIM’s Sahelian units are more interconnected than most think, to the point of sharing fighters for different operations. This is far from conclusive evidence, and I’d have to see the full transcript of Mouawiya’s testimony for more information, but it’s certainly a fascinating detail.

Either way, Mouawiya’s statements add an interesting look inside AQIM’s operations in the Sahel, and provide further proof that much of what is commonly thought about AQIM may need to be reconsidered, in light of other evidence.

Algeria: The “dur” who came in from the cold

This piece is a guest post from Kal, the author of The Moor Next Door, a Maghreb-focused blog.

Last week the Algerian daily El Watan reported that Gen. Bachir Tartag had been appointed to head of the Directorate for Internal Security (DSI) within Algeria’s main intelligence service, the Department of Intelligence and Security (Département de Renseignement et de la Sécurité, or DRS). This development received an unusual amount of attention from the Algerian (and to a lesser extent) regional press. The appointment is important because the DSI is the core sub-department of Algeria’s intelligence services and is responsible for, among other things, the country’s campaign against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and counter-intelligence. The appointment is notable because Gen. Tartag, as media reports have noted, has a storied past during Algeria’s civil war with Islamist militants and held several important posts within the DRS during the 1990s — he is also believed to be close to Algeria’s spy chief Gen. Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Mediene, and is associated with the military’s hardline camp (El Watan refers to him as “un dur parmi les durs” in English “a hardliner among hardliners.”[i] Media reports reviewed here variously assert Gen. Tartag is being emplaced as a possible successor to the ageing Gen. Mediene, a return to a more hardline policy on the Islamist opposition, a response to the regional instability in light of the Arab Spring, as well as other possibilities. These press accounts are summarised and analysed below. Because so little can be known about the workings of Algeria’s military and intelligence command this post does not come down in favour of any particular theory or view of Gen. Tartag’s appointment but attempts to tease out what kind of audience the publicity around the move points toward and what trends it might relate to in Algeria’s political scene.

El Watan published a detailed article on 26 December discussing various reasons for Gen. Bachir Tartag’s (a.k.a., ‘Athman’; he also goes by ‘le Bombardier’) appointment to the top post in the DSI (most English-language and many international French language ports on this development cite the El Watan article). The official reason for previous counter-intelligence chief Gen. Abdelkader Kherfi’s (a.k.a., ‘Gen. Ahmed’; used interchangeably with ‘Kherfi’ in the article) departure is ill health, and reports say he was scheduled for a trip abroad for a major surgery this week (though it also notes some of its sources did not confirm this; Gen. Kherfi is over sixty years old), while Kalima DZ’s report says ‘contrary to some reports’ Gen. Kerfi was not removed for corruption but for ‘reasons of strategic change.’ El Watan writes he was dismissed as well for ‘the many setbacks suffered by the security services in the fight against AQIM.’ Maghreb Intelligence writes Gen. Tartag had been considered for a top Army post after his retirement in 2007 but that this was blocked by the ‘presidential clan’ because ‘President [Abdelaziz] Bouteflika did not want the military to have a shady reputation.’ It then goes on to mention the DRS chief Mediene’s ‘regular’ visits to the United States, ‘not for NBA games, which he loves, but for medical treatment’ and speculating Gen. Tartag’s appointment is a move to put in place a successor for the ageing and reportedly ill Mediene (‘who knows the countdown for him has begun’; ‘according to a former high ranking Algerian, he wants to lock in his successor’). It cites a ‘French diplomat in Paris’ as saying ‘he who controls the DSI controls the DRS and he thus controls Algeria.’ Le Matin’s 26 December report argues the appointment is ‘synonymous with a strategic shift in the strata of power.’ It shares El Watan’s view that Gen. Kherfi was removed due to recent setbacks, noting the kidnapping of European aid workers on 23 October in the Polisario-run Rabouni camp, located in Algeria, in particular as a motivation. It shares Maghreb intelligence’s backstory about Gen. Mediene wanting to appoint Gen. Tartag in 2007 but being blocked by the president (it actually says ‘Gen. Mhenna Djebbar or Athmane Tartag’; Gen. Djebbar heads the DRS’s Directorate for Central Security, or DCSA). It places Gen. Tartag in a group of ranking DRS officers it calls ‘“the Four Musketeers,” who make up the operational command of the DRS and have remained loyal to General Toufik Mediene.’ It says the head of external security (Directorate for Documentation and External Security, or DDSE) Gen. Rachid Lalali’s ‘position appears ambiguous with respect to this’ appointment, going on to say the security situation in the Sahel ‘has become a matter of internal security which will be handled by Gen. Tartag.’

El watan describes Gen. Kherfi’s background as ‘academic’ as compared to Gen. Tartag’s presentation as ‘a practical man with long experience in the fight against terrorism.’ Gen. Tartag was the interim head of DSI after the death of Gen. Smain Lamari in 2007, before Gen. Kherfi took over. Maghreb Intelligence reminds its readers of Gen. Tartag’s reputation during the Civil War for brutality and alleged excesses, including extrajudicial killings and torture and so on (saying he was known then ‘for his dubious methods and immoderate taste for violence’). Le Matin’s 23 December report puts the appointment in terms of a struggle between the Bouteflika and Mediene clans as to how to proceed with the reform process in Algeria, predicting an ‘Islamist-nationalist coalition’ after next spring’s elections and the DRS’s adaptation to the changing climate. Le Matin also mentions Gen. Tartag as having a reputation among his peers as ‘a notorious case’ or ‘a butcher who used to be close to the Janvieristes’ (the generals who organised the 1991-1992 coup d’etat). Until now he had been retired, and the report says he has close relations with Gen. Mhenna Djebbar of the DCSA and Gen. Rachid Lalali of the DDSE  and says the appointment is less to do with terrorism than ‘laying golden goose eggs.’ Kalima DZ writes about the regime wanting to reinforce itself by reinforcing the DRS in case of a scenario where there is major upheaval and the regular Army sides with an opposition trend or where desertions and defections undermine regime cohesion. The regime is concerned the regular army (still a conscript force) could end up as in Syria, where regular soldiers have defected in large numbers or as inTunisia, where the regular military refused to execute orders, turning against the deep state.  The appointment of a hardliner like Gen. Tartag thus allows the regime to ‘reinforce the safe side, i.e., the DRS and better control the state apparatus and society.’ Kalima DZ’s report also notes, like El Watan’s, notes Gen. Kherfi ‘did not know how to, or could not, prevent the proliferation of riots, strikes, rallies and the media and the return to the field of radical opposition’. It says Gen. Tartag’s appointment ‘clearly announces the return to repression and barbouzardes  methods’ (or ‘dirty work’ by the intelligence services). It anticipates Gen. Tartag will respond more harshly and more speedily to events like the 2010-2011 winter riots  than his predecessor, that while elsewhere ‘wise men’ are trying to push reform and change, ‘the Algerian generals have decided to raise a dam against the tide of history.’

The El Watan article presents his appointment as an effort by the President and intelligence head Mediene to ‘eradicate the last foci of [AQIM] that still exist in the north of the country and to prevent the possible proliferation of terrorism to the borders with Libya, Niger and Mali, particularly  following the important geopolitical upheaval coming out of North Africa.’ It then goes on to point to the flow of weapons out of Libya into the hands of ‘jihadists’ after the war and cites army sources as saying the military border patrols ‘regularly intercepts shipments of arms from Libya and Mali.’ Finally, it notes that Gen. Tartag’s appointment, in light of the rise of Islamist-led governments in Tunisia, Libya and Morocco, would better prepare Algeria to defend itself in case the religious elements among Algeria’s neighbors try ‘to lend a hand to their “brothers” in Algeria and complete the circle of the Arab Spring.’ It then says the DSI is the ‘backbone’ of the DRS and handles efforts against espionage, internal subversion and ‘is considered the main contact for foreign secret services on issues related to terrorism.’

What this all means

The politics of the Algerian military and DRS are opaque and obscure to outsiders (and Algerians, for that matter), and analysis of their machinations is as good as speculation due to the lack of hard information. The press accounts mentioned above refer to Gen. Tartag’s reputation from the civil war as a hardliner as a signal of the regime’s — or at least the deep state’s — intention to adopt a firm stance in a time of regional instability and internal uncertainty, both in terms of succession and the direction of politics generally. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is believed to be ill (possibly suffering from cancer) while DRS-chief Gen. Mohamed Mediene, who is widely regarded as the next most powerful person in the country, also lacks a widely recognized protégé. Reports characterising Gen. Tartag as being promoted as a possible successor to the leadership of Gen. Mediene’s camp within the regime point to rumors of Gen. Mediene also suffering from an unnamed illness. Rumors that the government’s reform program, announced in the early spring, has taken longer than anticipated over the last year point to Bouteflika’s deteriorating health as a causal factor; other rumours claimed, as in some of the reports mentioned above, that Gen. Mediene was suffering from an unknown illness, sometimes mentioning a heart attack and trip abroad for treatment (these are discussed less frequently than rumours about President Bouteflika’s health and are much more difficult to assess let alone verify). Both men are in their seventies. Gen. Tartag is younger than Gen. Mediene and Gen. Kherfi, who is also said to suffer from an unnamed illness, as mentioned in the El Watan report. The notion he has been promoted to extend the legacy of the military hardline whose political and cultural legacy goes back to the January 1992 experience does appear reasonable in this context.

The appointment of Tartag points to a number of trends in Algeria’s internal and regional position. 2011 saw an uptick in the number of terrorist incidents in Algeria, including a prominent attack on the Académie militaire inter-armes at Chercell (AMIA-Cherchell) in August and the October kidnappings at Tindouf. Furthermore, the war in Libya has produced an increased level of smuggling and trafficking activity on the border, which, the Algerians claim, has been to the benefit of AQIM activities in northern Algeria. At a formal level Gen. Tartag’s return signals the return of one of Algeria’s more notorious hardliners, part of a group known as the eradicateurs, who ran the offensive against the Islamist armed groups and militias during the 1990s. This goes with the refrain in several Algerian reports that Gen. Tartag is seen to be tasked with in essence cleaning up the situation as what where previously external problems have become increasingly internal ones. A more aggressive and hardline internal security disposition thus goes along with evidence of a more assertive policy on the frontiers. In the last month Algeria has stepped up its counter-terrorism cooperation with border states, sending trainers and advisors to Mauritania and Mali and announcing joint patrols with Niger. Its previous posture was generally restricted to internal counter-terror efforts and indirect support to neighbouring countries who tend to rely on foreign (especially European and American) security and military cooperation. The new appointment thus looks like a component of this wider shift.

Algeria’s internal politics are also a point of some uncertainty. Though Algeria has not seen a full on protest movement aimed at overthrowing its regime, it has faced many strikes and organised protests by unions and students. Algeria’s core political and military leadership is ageing and the government has no formal succession posture as yet. The mention of the regime  preparing itself for the possibility of unrest or for increased political activity by Algerian Islamists in the lead up to the May 2012 parliamentary election point to a hardening of views in the government. In some reports the narrative about Algeria being encircled by the Arab Spring and or, as it was put in En-Nahar recently ‘surrounded by Islamists to the east and terrorists to the south’, appears to have been received from government or military sources. Among the DSI’s responsibilities are, according to the accounts of Algerian military defectors including Samraoui and Abdelkader Tigha, monitoring domestic dissent and political subversion as well as fighting terrorism. This suggests the move may also be intended to send a message to Algeria’s internal political opposition.

That Gen. Tartag’s appointment has been covered as heavily as it has in over the last week itself indicates the government hopes to project a message to reassure hardliners within the military and their sympathisers as the government announces its limited reform platform. El Watan’s article on the story relies heavily on military and (anonymous) official sources and its concluding paragraphs appear to point designed to highlight Gen. Tartag’s reputation for firmness and the necessity for such qualities in the context of rising Islamist power and deteriorating security.   In the last two months leaders of Algeria’s legal Islamist parties have announced their intention to run on reformist platforms in Algeria’s spring 2012 parliamentary election and leaders of the banned Islamist Salvation Front (FIS) have issued statements on their intention to pressure the government to recognise their party through international bodies such as the United Nations. This has caused some secular and pro-military Algerians to worry about the direction of the country’s politics, as pointed out by Andrew Lebovich in his study of AQIM attacks in northern Algeria in August. The reference in the El Watan piece to Islamist parties in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia helping Algerian Islamist groups subvert the regime speaks to a fear among some in the political class anxious over perceived official accommodation for the cultural and social conservatives and Islamists in under Bouteflika. The relative publicity around Gen. Tartag’s appointment may be meant as a sign to such elite hardliners that the regime intends to control the Islamist trend and contain circumstances that might open space to the Islamist trend.

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[i] Gen. Tartag’s background is especially notorious in the external opposition, mainly in Europe, where Army and DRS defectors have accused him of atrocities. In the early 1990s Tartag was in the DCSA and the Principal Centre for Military Investigation (CPMI), where former DRS Colonel and defector Col. Mohamed Samraoui has claimed he was one of ‘a very small number of DRS officials carefully selected well before the coup’ in 1991-1992 to deal with the infiltration and manipulation of Islamist groups and militias, including ‘fuelling these groups’ “natural” violence’ (Samraoui, Chronique des années de sang, Paris, 2003, pp.149). The CPMI’s main responsibility was monitoring members of the military. Samraoui, like some of the recent news reports, claims Tartag had been removed from service in 2001 so the army chiefs would be able to distance themselves involvement in alleged atrocities committed by subordinates (he also accuses him of running death squads). That he was allowed to serve as interim DSI head and his permanent appointment was vetoed by the president has been attributed to similar motivations. By press accounts Gen. Tartag has remained in the proximity of Gen. Mediene during his retirement.