Big Happenings in a Big Desert – Updated

The last 24 hours have seen an unusual amount of activity by and involving terrorist groups in the Sahel. This morning a suicide bomber detonated a Toyota truck filled with explosives at the gates of the Gendarmerie in the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset, an attack swiftly claimed in a phone call to the AFP in Bamako by the AQIM “splinter group” MUJWA – the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa. The attack came just hours after AQIM freed a Mauritanian gendarme kidnapped in a cross-border raid in December, Ely Ould Elmoctar. And reports circulated today that MUJWA had also freed an Italian humanitarian worker kidnapped in the Polisario-run camps at Tindouf in October, Rossella Urru. Oddly enough, a source close to the negotiations for Urru and two Spaniards taken from Tindouf told the AFP today that MUJWA wanted $30 million for the hostages, including Urru.

This flurry of activity will doubtless lead to questions about the lingering effect of instability in the Sahel and the spreading reach of AQIM and linked groups in the region. But more importantly, the events of the past 24 hours, taken in conjunction with other incidents that have recently taken place lead me to believe not only that AQIM is gearing up for further actions in the area, but that we now have enough evidence to conclude that the creation of MUJWA last fall marked not a splintering of AQIM, but rather a reorganization of men and resources.

An attack most unusual

First, let’s deal with today’s suicide bombing in Tamanrasset. The attack, which the Algerian daily El Watan said was almost certainly conducted by a “subsaharan,” wounded 23 people and caused major damage to the Gendarmerie. The Mauritanian news site Agence Nuakchott d’Information (ANI), which has published AQIM statements in the past and has good contacts with the group, has tentatively identified two men they say conducted the attack, Abou Anass al-Sahraoui (denoting either that he is from the Western Sahara or has links to Sahraouis) and Abou Jendel al-Azawadi (signifying he is likely from northern Mali).

A number of things are unique about this attack. While AQIM has in the past conducted suicide attacks in northern Algeria and Mauritania, this is the first major attack by a jihadist group that I can recall taking place in Tamanrasset in the past few years, and certainly the first suicide attack. Despite the growing instability in the Sahel, southern Algeria is generally considered a safe zone, and Tamanrasset in particular boasts a large security presence, given the city’s important role as a desert waypoint for travel and trade, both licit and illicit.

This attack demonstrates the continued availability of suicide bombers in the region, as well as the presence of high explosives, a likely consequence of the massive flow of weapons and explosives into southern Algeria and the Sahel as a result of the instability in Libya. And AQIM in particular has been increasingly active in southern Algeria, and not just in smuggling – Algerian forces engaged AQIM members in a firefight near the Malian/Algerian border town of Tin Zaouatine last month, and other AQIM members were reportedly the target of an airstrike in the country’s south days later.

Yet the fact that the attack was claimed by MUJWA – and not AQIM – should raise eyebrows. After all, when MUJWA came onto the scene in December, its members stated that MUJWA’s goal was to spread jihad and shariah to West Africa, citing as inspiration historical militant leaders in the region, including Usman Dan Fodio and El Hajj Omar Tell. Yet as Algerian blogger “7our” pointed out on Twitter this morning (my translation), “The only 2 actions of MUJWA, who want to ‘spread jihad in West Africa,’ have targeted Algeria.” Even as a “dissident” group, MUJWA still seems to be fighting AQIM’s jihad.

I have never been comfortable with the reports that MUJWA had truly “broken off” from AQIM. For one thing, as noted above, it is odd that despite having ostensibly split from AQIM, MUJWA has still chosen to target Algeria in such a serious fashion. And even before the Tamanrasset attack, MUJWA has behaved and spoken much as AQIM does, with the group’s leader Kheirou even declaring war on France – a favorite AQIM propaganda target -  with attack in a video released in December. We also should not forget that Kheirou spent several years under the command of key AQIM figure Mokhtar Belmokhtar (also known as Khaled Abou al-Abass).

Moreover, the very reason for supposedly founding the group was for Mauritanians and others to break away from AQIM’s Algerian-dominated leadership. Yet this is odd, given that despite AQIM’s many failures as a jihadist organization, it has arguably been more successful than any other al-Qaeda affiliate in recruiting a diverse group of people, including Malians, Mauritanians, Tuareg, Senegalese, Guineans, and more. Indeed, Kheirou himself appeared in a 2010 video produced by the group explicitly for the purpose of showing its diversity.

This diversity does not mean, of course, that some members of AQIM were not unhappy with the group’s leadership. Yet Kheirou’s long involvement with AQIM at a high level, combined with the persistent similarities between AQIM and MUJWA, leave open the possibility that the “split” between the two was not as definitive as some analysts believe. The circumstances surrounding the liberation of Ely Elmoctar and Rossella Urru lend some credence to this theory.

And the truth (or a deal) shall set you free

On the surface, the liberation of Ely Ould Elmoctar and Rossella Urru appear to be separate events. Elmoctar’s kidnapping was claimed by AQIM, and appears to have been the work of Mauritanian AQIM commander Khaled es-Chinguitty. AQIM demanded the liberation of two prisoners held by Mauritania in return for Elmoctar, whose disappearance prompted protests in Mauritania and solicited the attention of opponents of President Ould Abdel Aziz. Elmoctar’s liberation came on the day AQIM promised to kill him if the group did not get what they wanted; it is reported that the Malian Abderrahmane Ould Medou, involved in the kidnapping of two Italians in 2009 in Mauritania and arrested by Mauritanian authorities, was freed as part of the deal for Elmoctar’s freedom.

Urru, whose kidnapping was claimed by MUJWA last December, was almost certainly freed in exchange for a ransom payment. We don’t know yet why the unnamed negotiator publicized the price for Urru and the two other victims on the day Urru was freed. However, it is possible that a) he was one of multiple negotiators competing to win the hostages’ freedom (as well as a cut of the ransom payment), as has happened in other cases, or b) that the announcement was simply a means of indicating to the Spanish government the price for their two citizens who remain captive. I do not think the timing is accidental, given the arrival in Bamako today of Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Garcia-Margallo to “inquire about the fate of the three Europeans” taken from Tindouf.

That said, there are other aspects to the two stories that seem too convenient to be mere coincidence. Looking simply at the facts of the case, we have two kidnappings by two ostensibly separate (but related) terrorist organizations, with hostages from each case freed on the same day and both sent back simultaneously to Bamako. The simultaneous liberation and return to Bamako of the hostages implies either coordination between the groups that kidnapped Elmoctar and Urru, or that the same negotiator worked out both arrangements.

A shared negotiator linked to the Mauritanian government seems likely, given the conveniently-timed meeting last week between Ould Abdel Aziz and an Italian envoy, Margueritta Bonivar. However, it defies credulity to think that the release of the hostages held by two separate groups could be conducted simultaneously without a certain level of cooperation and coordination between MUJWA and AQIM. It is thus not illogical to suspect that the two were released as part of the same deal.

Things aren’t always what they seem

It is dangerous to draw sweeping conclusions from incomplete and circumstantial evidence, especially given the opaqueness of AQIM’s structure and operations and the relative lack of reporting on the group and the region in which it operates. And there is much that we do not know and may never learn about today’s bombing and hostage releases.

However, the events of the last 24 hours provide some indications of coordination between AQIM and MUJWA. Additionally, the fact that both groups appear to be increasingly active in Algeria and in targeting the Algerian security forces show the remarkable similarities between them, especially given MUJWA’s stated mission of moving the jihad south, not north.

The question is, given the sudden uptick in movement by both groups, what does this all mean?

As I previously noted, any conclusions drawn on such thin information are likely to be incomplete. But this morning’s attack, as well as the increased attempts by AQIM members to infiltrate southern Algeria from the group’s safe haven in northern Mali, could indicate a concerted effort by both MUJWA and AQIM to increase the pace of operations in Algeria proper.

This move north could be a reaction to the increasingly tenuous situation in northern Mali, given the ongoing Tuareg rebellion there and increased Malian military presence near key parts of the Adrar des Ifoghas, where AQIM commander Abou Zeid is known to operate. But it could also mark the start of a new and more deliberate campaign against Algerian forces. And if, as I believe, MUJWA is less a breakaway faction of AQIM and more of a partner or sub-unit, then it would appear the jihad in West Africa will be on hold for sometime to come.

UPDATE: It appears I wrote too soon. ANI, which initially reported not only that both Elmoctar and Urru had been freed but that both were expected to arrive in Bamako, reported today that in fact Elmoctar was still being held by AQIM. It seems like the negotiations were very close to being concluded, but then for reasons as yet unknown were suspended. This could explain the premature reports of their release.

The ANI article is still interesting for what it reveals – while it says two separate negotiation channels were at work for the release of the two separate hostages held by two separate groups, the ANI report suggests that both AQIM and MUJWA agreed to seek the release of Abderrahmane Ould Meidou. According to the same report, AQIM leader Yahya Abou Alhamam (who has been reported dead several times in the past) in particular sought Ould Meidou’s release, as did MUJWA leader Sultan Ould Badi, who along with other MUJWA members has “social relations” with Ould Meidou.

The fact that Elmoctar and Urru may not have been released yet takes away some of the support for the argument I laid out in the post above. Due to the evidence available and other things that I have heard or suspect, I still stand by my analysis. That said, I think that if the above story valid – though we must be careful about all reports where we can’t ascertain for ourselves the sourcing – we can still see the close personal and social links that likely exist between MUJWA and AQIM. Though this should be of no surprise whether MUJWA is a “splinter” group or simply a reorganized part of AQIM, the report would indicate that the groups are in contact and willing to work with each other in some capacity. Either way, there’s much more to this story, and we will hopefully have better information in the days to come.

23 Responses to Big Happenings in a Big Desert – Updated

  1. Analitikis says:

    Excellent piece.

  2. Pingback: AQIM activity in the Sahara in relation to travel - Page 24 - The HUBB

  3. Chupita says:

    Great article. Thanks for this, very interesting.

  4. tidinit says:

    You got it right Andrew. MUJWA and AQIM is the same. The creation of MUJWA is to try to show that the emirs of this movement are not only Algerians, but also from the south. Who is doing this? Can’t guess, but should have a PhD in organizational skills or a well trained in one of the best military academies. From this the door is open for all kinds of conspiracy theories that tell the real thing most of the time.

    If MUJWA is dealing with West Africa, why then hit Algeria?

    Interesting this simultaneous deal with regard to the libaration of both Ely Ould Moctar and Rosella Urru, supposed to have been kidnapped by 2 different movements. So, whatever way you turn this looks for me a kind of state sponsored terrorism and no one can guess who.

    Oh yes! The negotiators have gotten their cut from the ransom, like since all this started with the German and Swiss hostages of 2003 or 2004. $1 or $2 million or more? Less? This has to stop anyway. Mali is paying today through its nose because it closed its eyes on this AQMI manipulated from A to Z and has one of its old negotiators waging a war against the country …

    This has to stop. But how? Excellent post and thanks Andrew.

  5. Jean-Baptiste says:

    The question could be: if it was so easy for a new group like MUJWA to hit southern Algeria on two occasions, then why didn’t QIM do it before? At the time of the Tindouf kidnap, Maghreb Confidential reported that Abuzaid was unhappy about the initiative and had asked the captors to release the hostages, prompting the split. Suddenly conspiracy theories of Algerian complicity with the southern branch of QIM don’t seem that outlandish…

    • @Jean-Baptiste What kind of conspiracy theory of Algerian complicity with the southern branch of QIM do you think of? Could you give a bit of substantion to your suggestion, please?

      • Jean-Baptiste says:

        I have no substantiation and I do not in general subscribe to conspiracy theories regarding AQIM, such as those put forward by Jeremy Keenan. But as an observer of the Sahel, these developments are making me question my assumptions.

        In particular, I assumed that the lack of serious attacks or kidnaps by AQIM in the Algerian far south so far reflected the effectiveness of the Algerian security forces in comparison to neighbouring countries. If MUJWA can pull off a highly complex SVBIED attack against the gendarmerie HQ in Tamanrasset three months after its creation, then maybe that assumption was wrong.

        What does that leave us with? Is it that AQIM had no intent to target Algeria in the first place? If so, for what reasons? Maybe they just didn’t want to take any chance triggering a strong response from the Algerians, who have traditionally been reluctant to intervene outside their borders. Or maybe they had other reasons. Or could it be that MUJWA is incrediblely more efficient than AQIM? I doubt so.

        Lots of questions but few answers.

  6. tidinit says:

    It appears that both hostages have not yet been released. A false info from ani.mr. Read there that MUJWA is asking for $30 million, insted of the $5 million indicated. Looks like the middlemen find 10% – 20% of $5 million peanuts …….

    Who is manipulating who?

  7. tidinit says:

    Andrew re: your update.

    You are 100% correct that MUJWA and AQMI are the same. The split for me is to justify that AQIM is no more under the hands of algerian emirs, but West Africans starting from Mauritania.

    We recall the abductors of the two Austrian hostages asking for the release of El Para …

    All cooked-up and too many bad cooks.

  8. @Jean-Baptiste The “highly complex SVBIED attack against the gendarmerie HQ in Tamanrasset” is remarkable indeed. (For the non-military amongst us: the abbreviation stands for Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) Who claimed the SVBIED attack in the name of MUJWA? Not the ones who performed the attack, I guess. The one who claimed the attack made the connection between a suicide attack and a kidnapping. Both actions have been directed against Algeria. How come you see an Algerian complicity? Is the complicity of rivals of Algeria not much more likely?

    • Jean-Baptiste says:

      I was mooting Algerian complicity with AQIM, not MUJWA. In my opinion there is no firm reason to believe the split was not real.

      There is (obviously unsubstantiated) speculation among observers in Mali and Mauritania that Moroccan intelligence might be behind MUJWA as a way to embarass Algeria…

      • van kaas says:

        The Saharawi initially accused Morocco of AQIM complicity hastily, but retracted that and after some time they accused Morocco of complicity with the kidnapping in Tindouf. The kidnapping was claimed by MUJWA. Now since that club is not associated with AQIM the Saharawis do not accuse Morocco with complicity with AQIM crimes. Could that be behind the broken link? A move to divert the attention of AQIM watchers away from Morocco.
        Well. Pure speculation ofcourse.

  9. tidinit says:

    CEMOC planned the creation of 75.000 forces against 200 jihadis while the later were building their forces in the Wagadou Forest in the next 18 months and said the same 18 months later. Look no further than what the conspiracy theorists are saying.

    I dont think the Algerians so incompetents to let the Moroccans attack them from a fabricated MUJWA by Morocco. Moreover, I do not think that Morocco will do that as the Algerians can do them worse. Everybody wondering what happened and no clue. The truth should be somewhere. Unfortunate no one beyond the security people in the concerned countries (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Nigeria) know the truth and these people will not say anything . Neither the US, France, UK and other members of the EU. Who think they dont’t know?

  10. Pingback: « Then it comes to be that the soothing light/At the end of your tunnel/It’s just a freight train comin’ your way » (« No leaf clover », Metallica) | Terrorismes, guérillas, stratégie et autres act

  11. Pingback: « Then it comes to be that the soothing light/At the end of your tunnel/It’s just a freight train comin’ your way » (« No leaf clover », Metallica) | Alliance Géostratégique

  12. Pingback: Back from a minor hiatus « The Moor Next Door

  13. Pingback: The Black Flag Flies in Mali « al-Wasat – الوسط

  14. Pingback: The Black Flag Flies in Mali « InPEC

  15. Pingback: Of Mergers, MUJAO, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar | al-Wasat - الوسط

  16. Pingback: Of Mergers, MUJAO, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar | Chainsoff's Blog

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 414 other followers

%d bloggers like this: